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Abstract
Under certain cost conditions the optimal insurance policy offers full coverage above a deductible, as
Arrow and others have shown. However, many insurance policies currently provide coverage against
several losses although the possibilities for the insured to affect the loss probabilities by several
prevention activities (multiple moral hazard) are substantially different. This article shows that optimal
contracts under multiple moral hazard generally call for complex reimbursement schedules. It also
examines the conditions under which different types of risks can optimally be covered by a single
insurance policy and argues that the case for umbrella policies under multiple moral hazard is limited in
practice.
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ABSTRACT: 
 
Under certain cost conditions the optimal insurance policy offers full coverage above a 
deductible, as Arrow and others have shown. However, many insurance policies currently 
provide coverage against several losses although the possibilities for the insured to affect 
the loss probabilities by several prevention activities (multiple moral hazard) are substan-
tially different. This paper shows that optimal contracts under multiple moral hazard gen-
erally call for complex reimbursement schedules. It also examines the conditions under 
which different types of risks can optimally be covered by a single insurance policy and 
argues that the case for umbrella policies under multiple moral hazard is limited in prac-
tice.  
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1. Introduction 
In the real world many insurance contracts cover different kinds of losses al-
though insured’s prevention activities affect the probability of each kind of loss in 
different ways. Take health insurance as an example, where one finds that a single 
policy covers risks like rectal cancer (where prevention does not have much ef-
fect) and lung cancer (where protection is highly effective). Other insurance con-
tracts cover different losses although prevention technologies vary for each kind 
of loss. Consider a household contents policy, covering the risk of burglary (the 
prevention of which requires one type of technology) as well as the risk of a light-
ning strike (which can be reduced by an entirely different type of technology). In 
both situations, intuition would suggest a different treatment of different types of 
risk in insurance contracts to give scope for well-directed incentives for preven-
tion to be in the insured’s interest, even though each risk might lead to the same 
monetary amount of loss. On the other hand, indemnity payments that depend on 
the type of loss suffered contradict the insured’s preferences for a safe income in 
exchange for a single premium. Therefore, as has been stressed in the principal-
agent literature (Holmstrom 1979; Laffont and Martimort 2002), an optimal insur-
ance contract has to strike a balance between providing appropriate incentives for 
prevention and the individuals’ demand for insurance protection.  
Optimal insurance contracts have been discussed widely in the literature since the 
early contribution by Arrow (1963). Arrow, not taking into account informational 
asymmetries, states that under certain conditions concerning a risk-neutral in-
surer’s cost function, an optimal insurance policy will offer full coverage above a 
nonnegative deductible. While full insurance (a deductible of zero) is optimal at 
actuarially fair premiums that cover exactly the expected value of indemnities, 
partial insurance turns out to be attractive if premiums contain a constant loading. 
Compared to any other feasible insurance arrangements a deductible policy con-
centrates indemnity on higher losses and thereby minimizes risk averse insured’s 
loss of expected utility due to the cost of insurance. We will refer to this result as 
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the standard insurance contract.1 Authors like Raviv (1979) and others2 have con-
firmed and extended Arrow’s result. At the end of his article Raviv (1979, 261) 
addresses the question of how to deal with multiple losses and concludes that “the 
results regarding optimal insurance policies hold unchanged when the insured 
faces more than one risk, when the loss considered is the loss from all those 
risks”. This first-best result for multiple losses is also confirmed by Gollier and 
Schlesinger (1995). As a consequence, they stress the desirability of an extremely 
simple form of an umbrella policy that contains a single deductible but provides 
protection against the full range of risks individuals are exposed to.  
In this paper, it will be shown that the introduction of multiple ex-ante moral haz-
ard generally changes the optimal insurance schedule in a way that is significantly 
more complex than insurance contracts we usually find in practice. Multiple ex-
ante moral hazard refers to a situation where several prevention activities affect 
the probabilities of different kinds of losses in different ways. Generally, an opti-
mal insurance arrangement under multiple moral hazard should neither contain a 
single deductible for all losses nor let the indemnity depend solely on the amount 
of losses. Instead, an optimal umbrella policy covering a range of risks has to be 
defined in a broader sense and is likely to feature different cost-sharing provisions 
for each type of risk. The properties of an optimal umbrella policy depend on the 
combination of losses and the ways probabilities of different losses are affected 
by prevention activities rather than on the amount of total loss, which alone does 
not contain much information about the insured’s prevention activities. The de-
terminants of an optimal umbrella policy under multiple moral hazard will be ana-
lyzed in more detail.    
An associated question is when the standard insurance contract prescribing a sin-
gle deductible for all kinds of losses is still optimal under multiple ex-ante moral 
hazard. Indeed, for a single loss and one prevention activity Holmstrom (1979) 
                                                 
1  Other authors argue that the standard insurance contract might also turn out to be optimal for other rea-
sons. Townsend (1979) and more recently Picard (2000) point out that a deductible can make sense if the 
insured can misrepresent the loss and verification is costly. Depending on the technology and cost function 
of verification, the standard insurance contract without co-insurance (i.e. full marginal indemnity) might 
well lead to a second-best optimum.  
2  See e.g. Mossin (1968), Moffet (1977) or Schlesinger (1981). Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) show that 
Arrows result can be proved using only second-degree stochastic-dominance arguments. 
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and Winter (2000) prove the standard contract to remain optimal if the insured can 
only affect the probability of the occurrence of a loss, but not its amount. This 
somewhat surprising result is driven by the fact that it is efficient in this case to 
punish the insured for every occurrence of a loss in order to give them some in-
centives for prevention. However, it would not be optimal to let the punishment 
depend on the size of the loss, since it does not contain any additional information 
about the insured’s level of prevention activities. As will be shown explicitly, the 
optimality of the standard insurance contract still holds when only one type of loss 
is concerned and various prevention activities affect the probability of this loss. 
It will also be shown that the standard insurance contract can never be optimal if 
two different losses can occur separately or simultaneously. Instead, our model 
indicates that for optimality the insured’s net wealth has to be lower if they have 
has to suffer both losses than in the case of one loss only. On the other hand, it is 
also not optimal to apply two deductibles for each loss if an individual has to suf-
fer both during one period.   
However, for practical purposes insurance arrangements must not be too compli-
cated; otherwise they become worthless to the insured that may not be able to cal-
culate and predict their claims to insurers any more. Therefore, simple indemnity 
schedules prescribing, say, a deductible and a co-insurance rate that depends on 
the amount of the loss, are likely to dominate in practice although they will gener-
ally not be optimal. We will develop some criteria for the combination of losses 
that can efficiently be covered by a single policy under multiple moral hazard. For 
this purpose, the paper explicitly states some specific conditions under which the 
optimal design continues to be the standard insurance contract and gives some 
criteria for the appropriateness of a co-insurance policy. In the light of our argu-
ment, some insurance policies found in reality may turn out to be ill-designed.    
Since a contract with a single deductible (and a single co-insurance rate) for all 
losses is not guaranteed to be superior to separate indemnity schedules each hav-
ing a separate deductible and a separate co-insurance rate, it is worth to question 
the advantage of combining different indemnity schedules into one umbrella pol-
icy. It will be argued that, in theory, several indemnity schedules, not providing 
full coverage against one type of each loss, cannot be optimized independently of 
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each other. However, this does not imply that the optimal portfolio of insurance 
contracts should be purchased from one insurer only. Consequently, the case for 
encompassing insurance contracts is very limited, which might explain why they 
are rarely observed in practice.   
The paper continues as follows: Section 2 uses a framework introduced by 
Schlesinger (1987). After reporting the fundamental result concerning the optimal 
design of an insurance contract for multiple losses without moral hazard in section 
2.1, section 2.2 introduces multiple ex-ante moral hazard; i.e. it is assumed that 
the insured’s self-protection activities cannot be observed by the insurer, who has 
to rely on proper incentives for self-protection instead. Section 3 looks at some 
two special cases that provide some more specific insights for optimal indemnity 
schedules under multiple moral hazard. The analyses by Raviv (1979), 
Schlesinger (1987), and Winter (2000) will turn out to be special cases of the 
broader model developed in this paper. A discussion of the consequences of our 
analysis for practical purposes follows in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. A general model for studying the optimal design of  
    insurance contract 
2.1 Optimal insurance contract without moral hazard 
In order to provide a fairly general framework for studying the optimal design of 
insurance contracts, Schlesinger (1987) introduces a model in which there are one 
state (no. 1) of no loss and three states (nos. 2,3,4) of loss with size , , and 
 which are arranged such that 
2L 3L
4L 432 LLL ≤≤ . This framework (although conven-
iently simple) is flexible enough to allow analyses of a wide range of insurance 
contracts. For example one is free to define , and as the occurrence of a 
loss A, a loss B, and the simultaneous occurrence of both losses, respectively.  
2L 3L 4L
The probability of these four states is  with . The expected utility 
 of an insured consequently reads as: 
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with W  denoting the exogenous wealth of the individual, P  the premium paid to 
the insurance, and  the indemnity received from the insurance in state . 
The utility function U is assumed to be twice differentiable with U  and 
, indicating risk-aversion. Furthermore, let absolute risk aversion be de-
creasing in wealth (DARA). 
0≥iI i
0>′
0<′′U
Insurers are risk neutral and the insurance industry is assumed to be competitive; 
i.e. given public information on the probability of losses, the premium cannot ex-
ceed the actuarially fair premium times a proportional loading ( )κ+1  in the long 
run, with 0>κ  representing the loading factor. This leads to the constraint: 
( ) 01 4
2
=−+ ∑
=
PIp
i
iiκ .                  (2) 
Finally, indemnities cannot be negative: 
0≥iI  for .                   (3) 4..2=i
Ignoring the non-negativity constraint for the moment, the optimal insurance con-
tract without moral hazard can be derived by maximizing (1) w.r.t. all , s.t. (2). 
The first-order conditions read for a fixed premium 
iI
µκ =+
+−−′
)1(
)( ii ILPWU   for 42K=i ,            (4) 
where µ  is the Lagrange multiplier for the premium function (2). FOC (4) states 
that an individual’s marginal utility should be the same in all loss states if . 
However, due to the loading, full insurance cannot be optimal. On the other hand, 
according to (4), the insured’s out-of pocket loss should be the same in each state 
of loss, calling for a deductible rather than a co-insurance rate. Finally, observing 
the non-negativity constraint (3),  has to be zero for small losses. This leads to 
the optimal indemnity function prescribing a deductible  and full reim-
bursement for losses that exceed the deductible: 
0>iI
iI
0>d
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This result has been proved by Arrow (1963), Raviv (1979), Schlesinger (1987), 
and Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) and does not depend on the expected utility 
framework employed here. Note that losses are arbitrary. As mentioned before, 
we are free to define , , and  as the occurrence of a loss A, a loss B, and 
the simultaneous occurrence of both losses, respectively. For the optimal indem-
nity being zero or offering full marginal reimbursement the sum of both losses is 
decisive. 
iL
2L 3L 4L
2.2 Optimal insurance contract for multiple losses and multiple prevention 
      activities 
To investigate the effects of moral hazard in a more general model, we now allow 
for self-protection activities. To be more concrete, let there be two self-protection 
activities, called  and , causing discomfort costs of ax bx ( )ba xx ,C , with 
0>∂∂ axC  and 0>∂∂ bxC  as well as 022 >∂∂ axC  and 02 >∂ bx2∂ C , rather 
than monetary costs. Discomfort costs reflect the disutility it causes e.g. to abstain 
from smoking or alcohol, to drive slowly or simply to spend time on prevention 
activities like exercises to reduce the probability of a heart attack. Discomfort 
costs enter individuals’ utility separately from the monetary terms.3 The two self-
protection activities affect the probabilities of the four states in the model, rather 
than the amount of loss in any particular state. A fairly general formulation to cap-
ture this effect is: 
( )[ ]
([ ]∑
=
−+−−⋅+ )
−−⋅=
4
2
1
,)(),(
,)(),(
i
baiibai
baba
xxCILPWUxxp
xxCPWUxxpEU
.         (6)  
                                                 
3  If prevention activities cause mainly monetary costs (like a more solid lock at the front door of a house), it 
is, of course, more appropriate to treat them in the exactly same way as other monetary costs, e.g. the pre-
mium. In this case one can still show the non-appropriateness of the standard insurance contract but can 
make less clear statements about the optimal insurance schedule under multiple moral hazard.  
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Since individuals decide on prevention before a loss occurs, ( )ba xx ,C  is the same 
in all four states of the world. If not stated otherwise, it is assumed that 0≤∂
∂
j
i
x
p  
and 02
2
≥∂
∂
j
i
x
p for i   and . For reasons of tractability we concentrate 
on activities that can unambiguously be regarded to be preventive activities and 
rule out that one of the activities,  or , might reduce the probability of one 
loss but increase the probability of another loss. To assure an interior solution, it 
is also assumed that 
42K= baj ,=
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−∞=
=0j
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∂
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i
x
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According to (6) the effect of each self-protection activity on all probabilities may 
be identical or different for each of the three loss states of the world. It is also pos-
sible that one self-protection activity affects one probability only; as analyzed be-
low in section 3.2. However, since the insurer cannot observe the self-protection 
activities of the insured, the insured will invest in self-protection only if (and as 
much as) they have an incentive to do so. This leads to the incentive compatibility 
constraints 
( )[ ]
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and 
( )[ ]
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xxCILPWUxxp
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b
.         (8) 
Besides the incentive compatibility constraints, the break-even constraint for the 
risk-neutral insurer has to be met. It serves as the insurer’s participation con-
straint. As before, insurers are risk neutral and act in a competitive environment. 
                                                 
4  For reasons of tractability all cross effects of preventive activities are assumed to be zero. 
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The premium P  is fixed and must, at least, cover expected indemnities and the 
loading: 
( ) 0),(1 4
2
≤−+ ∑
=
PIxxp
i
ibaiκ .               (9) 
The final constraint, as before, states that the indemnity must not be negative: 
0≥iI .                      (10) 
Under the assumptions we made about the prevention technology, it is guaranteed 
that the optimal effort for prevention is positive and that the first-order conditions 
of (7) and (8) indeed indicate an optimum. Consequently, the incentive compati-
bility constraints (7) and (8) can be replaced by their first order conditions. These 
read  
( ) 0,4
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and 
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i
b
i
x
xxCU
x
p ,               (12) 
with  being shorthand for the insured’s utility in state i . Equations (11) and 
(12) state that in an optimum the change in expected utility due to an increase of 
the self-protection activity has to equal the marginal discomfort costs caused by 
these activities.  
iU
The optimization problem can now be stated as a problem of Lagrange: Maximize 
(6) with respect to  s.t. (9), (10), (11), and (12). Disregard (10) for the 
moment and let 
42 II K
0≥aλ , 0≥bλ , and 0≥Pλ  be the shadow prices on constraints 
(11), (12), and (9) respectively. The resulting first-order conditions are: 
0)1( =+−

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 ′∂
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b
i
i
a
i
aii pUx
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x
pUp        (13) 
for   42K=i , 
which can be rewritten as 
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Equation (14) implies that in equilibrium 01 >
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According to (11) and (12), each amount of prevention activity is chosen such that 
the marginal increase of expected utility due to prevention’s effect on all prob-
abilities equals the marginal costs of discomfort caused by prevention activities. 
The resulting bundle of prevention activities is generally not optimal for each kind 
of loss. Equation (15) mirrors the fact that probabilities and marginal effective-
ness of preventive effort (fixed by the insured) in equilibrium need not to be the 
same for all states of loss. To get some more insights in the determinants of an 
optimal indemnity schedule assume that in equilibrium at least one of the preven-
tion activities has a higher relative effect on the probability of state  i



 =∂∂ bak
p
xp
i
ki , ,  relative to state  j 


 =∂∂ bak
p
xp
j
kj , , . This causes the rhs of 
(15) to take a value greater than 1. Consequently, the relative effect of prevention 
on probabilities in equilibrium unambiguously leads to U ji U ′>′ , calling for a 
lower net wealth in state i  than in state j  in order to give the insured appropriate 
incentives to engage more in prevention activities where prevention’s relative ef-
fect on probability is greater. Consequently, ignoring restriction (10), relative net 
wealth in each state of loss should not depend on the amount of loss but on rela-
tive effectiveness of prevention activities in equilibrium. This result is, of course, 
9 9  
in line with the principal-agent model: If the insured can affect the amount of loss 
the insurance contract should be give them an incentive for adequate prevention.   
Reintroducing the non-negativity constraint on indemnities, equation (10), can 
lead to substituting the equal signs in equations (15) and (16) by inequality signs 
and an indemnity of zero for some loss states if the loss occurred is too small. 
However, in contrast to the standard insurance contract the resulting indemnity 
schedule cannot meaningfully be described as a deductible schedule any more, 
since the share of the loss the insured have to bear as out-of pocket costs is gener-
ally different at each state of the world and depends on determinants which can 
differ significantly for each kind of loss. 
It is worthwhile to note that that these findings give rise to the idea that some in-
surance contracts we find in practice may be ill-designed. Take car-insurance as 
an example, where the category ‘car-accident’ might be too coarse for designing 
an appropriate insurance policy since this sole category does not reflect the differ-
ent possibilities of the insured to affect the probabilities of different kinds of acci-
dents: While accidents can be caused by the slightest inattentiveness of drivers 
irrespective of how carefully they use to drive, driving significantly above the 
speed limit clearly increases the (relative) probability of an accident and could be 
prevented by the simple prevention measure of driving slower. According to the 
results developed above, for an interior solution, a more meaningful policy would 
grant insured a lower net wealth in state of accidents caused by driving too fast 
and a higher net wealth in states of accidents that, say, happen in a car park be-
cause of drivers being slightly unaware for a moment.  
However, as a reference point, one can analyze the conditions under which the 
standard insurance contract, offering full coverage above a deductible, can be op-
timal under multiple moral hazard. A sufficient condition for the relative marginal 
utility ji U ′′U  to be 1 is that the fractions in the nominator and the denominator of 
equation (15) are the same, i.e., 
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Since in an interior solution aλ  and bλ  are both nonnegative and so 0≥ba λλ , for 
 a higher relative effect of prevention activity  on  has to be compen-
sated by a higher relative effect of prevention activity b  on  and vice versa. In 
this case, an optimal insurance contract would still show one single deductible for 
both losses.  
ji UU ′=′ a jp
ip
3. The case for different optimal indemnity schedules 
    under multiple ex-ante moral hazard 
In this section two special cases are investigated that serve to give some more 
theoretical insights and intuition into the limits of designing optimal insurance 
policies under multiple moral hazard in practice. 
3.1 One loss of different amounts 
For the first special case, we explicitly use the framework introduced above to 
assign different amounts of a loss to the states  of the model, which cannot be 
affected by the insured. However, as before, the insured’s prevention activities 
affect the probability of occurrence of the loss. Let the probability of occurrence 
be  and let state 1 in section’s 2.2 model represent the state of no loss 
which consequently has the probability 
4..2
),( ba xxpr
( ))1 bx,( axpr− . The model’s three other 
states then represent states of loss with different amounts of losses (see figure 1).  
Note that self-protection has no effect on any . The four states of our model 
therefore have the following probabilities: 
ihp ,
11 11  
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with . Differentiating , for the states of loss, 1
4
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Figure 1: Prevention affects probability but not  size of loss 
 
( )),(1 ba xxpr−
),( ba xxpr
2,hp
3,hp
3,hp
No loss 
Loss of amount2 
 
 
Loss of amount3 
 
Loss of amount4 
Plugging (18) into (15) reveals the critical terms on the rhs of (15) to be the same 
for all i . Therefore, ignoring restriction (10), the insured should always suf-
fer the same out-of-pocket loss. If restriction (10) is taken into account, the opti-
mal insurance contract again has the form of the standard insurance contract, 
4..2=

 ≥−=
otherwise,0
 if, DLDL
I iii ,                (19) 
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that is full reimbursement above a nonnegative deductible . This is exactly in 
line with the solutions Holmstrom (1979) and Winter (2000) present for one pre-
vention activity only. It turns out to be a special case of our more general analysis. 
In especially, the solution does not depend on the number of prevention activities. 
In order to depart from full insurance and to give the insured an incentive to invest 
in prevention, the deductible has to be nonnegative. In contrast to Arrow’s analy-
sis, the nonnegative deductible is necessary independent of a loading in the pre-
mium. Since the amount of loss is not affected by the insured and does not reveal 
any further information on the insured’s effort for prevention, a deductible is suf-
ficient. 
D
However, the assumption that all states of losses are equally likely to occur irre-
spective of the insured’s effort for prevention is rarely appropriate for all kinds of 
insurable losses. For example, it might be acceptable for losses due to burglary, 
where a well locked door is unlikely to affect the amount of stolen goods if bur-
glars have managed to break the front door in the first place. In contrast, to return 
to the example of car insurance, the probability of high losses caused by car acci-
dents might well correlate with the way people drive. While car driver can cause a 
small damage to their own cars or to other cars in a car park by being inattentive 
for a moment, the probability of large damages likely correlates with high speed 
or drinking of alcohol. An optimal insurance contract in this situation could either 
define a narrow range of differentiated categories of losses and prescribe a rela-
tive net wealth of the insured for each of the categories (as discussed above) or 
define a broader category of ‘car accidents’ and introduce a, linear or non-linear, 
co-insurance rate in addition to the deductible, which might be the more practica-
ble form of an insurance policy.      
3.2 Two different losses and accumulation of losses 
For a second special case suppose that there are two different kinds of losses 
which can occur alone or can happen both during one period of time. For exam-
ple, think of two different kinds of illness. Let  and  be the probability of 
sickness 1 and sickness 2 respectively. The four states of the model then are de-
fined as follows: 
1pr 2pr
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Differentiating these probabilities w.r.t.  and to  yields ax bx
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i
i
i
i
xp
xp
xp
xp
4
3
2
1 ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )prxprprxpr
prxprprxpr
prxprprxpr
prxprprxpr
ii
ii
ii
ii
∂∂+∂∂
−∂∂+∂∂−
−∂∂+∂∂−
−∂∂−−∂∂−
221
1221
2112
1221
1
1
11
        (21) 
for    i ba,= . 
To see if the out-of-pocket loss in case of sickness 1 in an optimal insurance con-
tract should be the same as in case of sickness 2, ij xp ∂∂  and for  
and  from (20) and (21) have to be plugged into (14). The resulting equa-
tions read: 
ip 42K=j
bai ,=
( ) ( )( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( )
2
21
2112
21
1212
1
1
1
1
1
11
U
prpr
prxprprxpr
prpr
xprprprxpr
bb
b
aa
a
P ′⋅












+
−⋅
−∂∂+∂∂−
+
+
−⋅
∂∂−+∂∂−+
=
κ
λ
κ
λ
λ ,     (22) 
     
( ) ( )( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( )
3
21
1221
21
122
1
1
1
1
1
111
U
prpr
prxprprxpr
prpr
prxprprxpr
bb
b
aa
a
P ′⋅












+
⋅−
−∂∂+∂∂−
+
+
⋅−
−∂∂+∂∂−+
=
κ
λ
κ
λ
λ       (23) 
and 
     
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) 4
21
1221
21
1221
1
1
1
U
prpr
prxprprxpr
prpr
prxprprxpr
bb
b
aa
a
P ′⋅












+
⋅
∂∂+∂∂
+
+
⋅
∂∂+∂∂+
=
κ
λ
κ
λ
λ         (24) 
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To see that a standard insurance contract cannot be optimal in this situation, it is 
sufficient to check if the values in the parentheses can be the same in (22), (23), 
and (24). However, equating the values in the parentheses of (22) with those of 
(24) and the values in the parentheses of (23) with those of (24) yields: 
a
b
b
a
xpr
xpr
∂∂
∂∂−=
2
2
λ
λ  and                 (25) 
a
b
b
a
xpr
xpr
∂∂
∂∂−=
1
1
λ
λ .                   (26) 
Due to sign contradiction, neither of the two conditions, (25) and (26), can be met 
if both activities, a  and , are preventive activities reducing the probability of a 
sickness. It is therefore impossible to justify the same out-pocket-loss in all states, 
which unambiguously excludes the standard insurance contract from being the 
optimal insurance policy. 
b
The optimal relative marginal utility between states 2 and 4 can be obtained by 
equating (22) and (24). Equating (23) and (24) reveals some more information 
about the relative marginal utility in states 3 and 4. Rearranging both equations 
yields 
1
1
11
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
4 >
⋅


 ∂∂+∂∂+⋅


 ∂∂+∂∂+
⋅



−
∂∂−∂∂+⋅



−
∂∂−∂∂+
=′
′
b
bb
a
aa
b
bb
a
aa
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
U
U
λλ
λλ
     (27) 
and 
1
1
11
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
3
4 >
⋅


 ∂∂+∂∂+⋅


 ∂∂+∂∂+
⋅


 ∂∂+−
∂∂−+⋅


 ∂∂+−
∂∂−+
=′
′
b
bb
a
aa
b
bb
a
aa
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
pr
xpr
U
U
λλ
λλ
,   (28) 
respectively. According to (14) both, the numerators and the denominators of (27) 
and (28), are positive in an interior solution. The nominators, however, also show 
positive terms in parentheses. Consequently, for an interior solution, the values of 
the fractions are greater than one and the insured’s net wealth has to be lower in 
state 4 than in states 2 or 3. 
15 15  
However, it will not generally be optimal to only add the insured’s out-of-pocket 
losses they have to bear if they suffer loss 1 or loss 2 to yield to optimal out-of-
pocket loss for the occurrence of both losses in the same period of time. Instead, 
the optimal out of pocket-losses in all three states of loss depend on the probabili-
ties of loss 1 and loss 2 and the marginal effect of both prevention activities,  
and   in equilibrium. An optimal umbrella policy would again have to prescribe 
a complex reimbursement schedule that is likely to be too complex for being writ-
ten down in an insurance contract.  
ax
bx
4.  Practical consequences for the design of insurance  
    contracts 
Collecting the results of the model, it is possible to derive the following conse-
quences for an appropriate design of umbrella policies under multiple moral haz-
ard: 
1. A pure deductible policy under multiple moral hazard is optimal only if 
the relative effect of one prevention activity on one loss is exactly com-
pensated by a higher relative effect of another prevention activity on an-
other loss (equation (16)). 
2. As a special case of consequence 1, a pure deductible policy is sufficient 
if insured can only affect the probability of a loss, but not its amount 
(equation (18) combined with equation (15) or (16)). 
3. A co-insurance policy can be justified if higher losses correlate with 
higher relative effects of prevention activities on their probabilities of oc-
currence (see section 3.1). 
4. Generally, the optimal umbrella policy cannot be described as a deducti-
ble policy combined with some simple form of co-insurance. Instead, an 
optimal contract would call for complicated reimbursement schedules, 
depending of the relative effects of prevention activities in each state of 
loss (equation (15)). 
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The last consequence obviously limits the feasibility of umbrella policies under 
multiple moral hazard, giving rise to the idea that simple insurance contracts, pre-
scribing a deductible and some simple (mostly linear) form of co-insurance, will 
continue to dominate in practice. They should be designed along the line sketched 
by consequences 1 to 3. Insured then have to optimize their portfolio of insurance 
contracts. Although for a number of reasons5 each insurance contract covering 
one type of risk cannot be optimized independently of each other, the optimal 
portfolio of insurance policies does not necessarily have to be bought from one 
insurer only. Instead, insured can either create their optimal portfolio themselves 
or give this task to an independent financial intermediary. Thus, there is no practi-
cal case for an encompassing insurance contract because of multiple moral haz-
ard. This is in sharp contrast to the idea of umbrella policies having the properties 
of the standard insurance contract as recommended on the basis of models that do 
not take into account informational asymmetries.  
5. Conclusion 
The literature on the optimal design of insurance policies started from settings 
where there is no moral hazard at all. Simple optimal insurance contracts in case 
of ex-ante moral hazard are derived for single losses only. Since this situation is 
unsatisfactory in the light of existing insurance contracts this paper investigates 
multiple losses and two self protection activities. 
The model presented here provides some useful insights in what kind of insur-
ance contracts may be advantageous under multiple moral hazard. The most im-
portant one is that the standard insurance contract, which is a policy offering full 
insurance above a deductible, is appropriate under certain conditions only, but 
not in general. Insurance schedules prescribing a simple form of co-insurance can 
only be justified if higher losses correlate in a simple way with higher relative ef-
fects of prevention activities on their probabilities of occurrence. This gives rise 
to the idea that some insurance contracts found in practice might be ill-designed.  
                                                 
5  See Schlesinger and Doherty (1985).  
17 17  
Furthermore, we provided an argument for the idea that not only simple umbrella-
policies, providing a stop-loss insurance against a complete range of losses, are 
far from being optimal, but that all forms of encompassing contracts in practice 
are not as attractive for the insured as they may look at first sight. Multiple moral 
hazard alone does not provide any evidence why insured should buy their com-
plete range of insurance protection in a single contract from one insurer only.  
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